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Conference Papers Year : 2019

A Two-Dimensional Self-coordination Mechanism of Agents in a Minority Game

Abstract

Coordination of several agents in accessing a limited resource is a common problem among various systems. In the absence of a central coordinator, the primary challenge of the problem is to bring equilibrium among agents in accessing a limited shared resource. The El Farol Bar Problem is the generic description of this problem. In this paper, we devised a new two-dimensional approach called Social Coordination (SoCo). In the first dimension, we define a new function, called $$ Effect ()$$, that plays a determinative role in choosing the strategy for the current action. In the second dimension, we define a new social coordination constraint that boosts the system to achieve the entire equilibrium, in which near optimum status in social and individual utilities are reached without any starvation cases. SoCo not only attempts to improve the social utility but also considers the individual utility and starvation as the optimization goals. The simulation results show that SoCo improves social utility by $$57.61\%$$ compared to similar approaches. The simulations demonstrate that the maximum starvation length of agents in SoCo is 7.93 times less than similar methods.
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hal-03769115 , version 1 (05-09-2022)

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Sanaz Hasanzadeh Fard, Hadi Tabatabaee Malazi. A Two-Dimensional Self-coordination Mechanism of Agents in a Minority Game. 8th International Conference on Fundamentals of Software Engineering (FSEN), May 2019, Tehran, Iran. pp.20-36, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-31517-7_2⟩. ⟨hal-03769115⟩
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